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Chunho Park, Michigan State UniversityWhy do some ethnic groups vote along ethnic lines while others do not? In this article, we theorize that the level of
ethnic voting depends, partially, on how ethnicity interacts with economic cleavages. Specifically, we argue that between–
ethnic group inequality (BGI) increases ethnic voting and that its effect strengthens as within–ethnic group inequality
(WGI) decreases. We thus posit that the full structure of ethnic inequality, not only between-group differences, matters
for ethnic voting. After presenting our argument, we conduct the first cross-national test of whether the effect of between-
group inequality on ethnic voting is conditional on the level of inequality within ethnic groups. Our analysis employs
group-level data on 200 ethnic groups from 65 countries. We find strong support for our hypothesis: BGI increases ethnic
voting, but its effect is conditional on WGI.Across four general elections since the end of SouthAfrica’s Apartheid era, the African National Congress(ANC) has won overwhelming majorities, reflecting
its dominance of the black vote.While the ANC typically wins
around 80% of the black vote, the Democratic Alliance (DA)
and its predecessors have won at least the same proportion of
the white vote. South Africa’s elections have thus been de-
scribed as a “racial census” in which the black majority has an
unassailable position (Ferree 2006). In such cases, it is easy to
imagine that voting according to one’s ethnicity reflects the
primacy of deeply held racial identities, with relatively stable
elections over time suggesting the logic of an “ethnic head
count” (Chandra 2004). Yet, the mere existence of multiple
ethnic groups does not always result in high levels of ethnic
voting (Posner 2004).
In this article, we posit that ethnic voting—which we de-
fine as the degree to which individuals from different ethnic
groups support distinct parties (Huber 2012)—is influenced
by how ethnicity interacts with economic cleavages. Specifi-
cally, we argue that ethnic voting is particularly elevatedwhen
ethnicity and socioeconomic inequality reinforce one an-
other. However, in a departure from prior research, we the-
orize that the full structure of ethnic inequality matters for
ethnic voting. While between–ethnic group inequality (BGI)Christian Houle (houlech1@msu.edu) is an assistant professor of political scien
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of within–ethnic group inequality (WGI): BGI’s effect is
strongest when WGI is low. When WGI is elevated, however,
the effect of BGI is reduced if not eliminated. In other words,
we posit that the effect of differences in income across ethnic
groups depends on how income is distributed among mem-
bers of the same groups.
We argue that four mechanisms drive the relationship.
First, BGI increases the difference between the preferences
over economic policies of members of different ethnic groups.
At the same time, a low WGI homogenizes the preferences of
members of the same group. Therefore, when BGI is high and
WGI is low, people from the same ethnic group are likely to
share similar preferences over economic policies and to vote
for the same parties. Second, as suggested by research in social
psychology and political science on reinforcing and crosscut-
ting cleavages, an individuals’ loyalty toward other members
of their group along one cleavage, such as ethnicity, is stronger
when they share membership in the same group along other
cleavages, such as class. When BGI is high and WGI is low,
people from the same ethnic groups are likely to feel closer to
one another and to identify more strongly with coethnics and
will thus be more likely to vote along ethnic lines. Third, when
BGI is high and WGI low, individuals from different ethnicce at Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824. Paul D. Kenny
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Social networks, in turn, influence voting behavior. Fourth,
overlapping ethnic and class cleavages facilitate ethnic mobi-
lization by political entrepreneurs.
We use survey data from the Afrobarometer, Latino-
barometer, World Value Survey (WVS), and Comparative
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), to develop group-level
indicators of ethnic voting as well as BGI and WGI. Our
data set contains over 560 ethnic group–survey year obser-
vations and covers 200 ethnic groups from 65 countries be-
tween 1995 and 2014. We show that ethnic groups that are
either much poorer or much richer than other ethnic groups
in their own country are more likely to vote along ethnic lines.
However, consistent with our hypothesis, the effect of BGI
weakens and eventually loses statistical significance as WGI
increases.
This article improves on existing research in two main
ways. First, and most important, we argue and empirically
demonstrate that ethnic voting is affected by the full struc-
ture of ethnic inequality, not only differences between ethnic
groups. We provide the first cross-national test of whether
the effect of between-group inequality on ethnic voting is
conditional on the level of inequality within ethnic groups.1
Second, our analysis is the first cross-national test of the
effect of ethnic inequality on ethnic voting that uses the eth-
nic group as its main unit of analysis.2 This is crucial because
in many instances different ethnic groups within the same
country have very different BGI,WGI, and ethnic voting levels.
Using a single aggregate value of BGI (as well as WGI and eth-
nic voting) for all groups of the same country is thus not ap-
propriate. Our empirical strategy enables us to test whether the
BGI andWGI scores of a given group affect the voting behavior
of that specific group.
ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND ETHNIC VOTING
Ethnicity is a subset of identity categories in which mem-
bership is determined by attributes associated with, or be-
lieved to be associated with, shared ancestry. This concep-
tualization of ethnicity encompasses ethnolinguistic, racial,
and ethnoreligious groups but not tribes and clans that con-
ceive of ancestry in strict genealogical terms or regions that
do not define commonality on the basis of a belief in shared
descent (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).1. Huber and Suryanarayan (2016) and Kolev and Wang (2010) do
test the effect of BGI on ethnic voting but do not test whether the effect is
contingent on the level of inequality within groups. Moreover, their unit of
analysis is the country-year, while ours is the ethnic group–year.
2. Huber and Suryanarayan (2016) also report a group-level analysis,
but it is restricted to India.
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levels of ethnic voting. We theorize that whether it does de-
pends, partially, on how ethnicity interacts with economic
cleavages. Where class and ethnic cleavages overlap, we ex-
pect ethnic voting to be higher. Specifically, we argue that
BGI increases ethnic voting and that its effect strengthens as
WGI decreases. Ethnic groups that are either considerably
poorer or richer than other groups in their own country are
more likely to vote along ethnic lines, especially when in-
equality among their members is low. When WGI is high,
however, large between-group discrepancies may not trans-
late into high levels of ethnic voting. We thus theorize that
the full structure of socioeconomic inequality both across
and within ethnic groups influences the degree of ethnic
voting.
Theories of ethnic politics have long noted the impor-
tance of differential resource endowments between groups in
sustaining ethnic conflict (Gurr 1970;Huber andMayoral 2014)
and more recently ethnic voting (Huber and Suryanarayan
2016). The more ethnic groups are stratified economically, the
more likely they are to engage in distinctive political behavior.
However, little explicit attention has been paid to how this re-
lationship might be conditioned by levels of inequality within
groups themselves (cf. Hechter 1978;Wimmer 2013, chap. 7).3
Rather, many theoretical models of ethnic politics implicitly
assume that high BGI necessitates low WGI (Gurr 1993;
Horowitz 1971; Tilly 1998).
However, WGI varies considerably across BGI levels.4 As
with BGI, the sources of variation in WGI are complex.
Empirical research indicates that elevated WGI results from
long-standing processes including the types of land and re-
source endowments historically held by certain groups (e.g.,
lands requiring irrigation), groups’ traditional dominance in
economic sectors that generate high levels of inequality (e.g.,
pastoralism), and groups’ cultural practices (e.g., impartible
inheritance; Smith et al. 2010).
Another possible cause of variation in WGI is variation
in geographic endowments within the region(s) or area(s)
inhabited by a group, at least for larger groups. As argued by
Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2016), differences
in geographic endowments between regions occupied by dif-3. Houle (2015), Houle and Bodea (2017), and Kuhn and Weidmann
(2015) do look at the full structure of ethnic inequality—i.e., BGI and its
interaction with WGI—but they focus on democratic consolidation, eth-
nic coups, and civil wars, respectively, not ethnic voting.
4. See app. sec. 5 (appendix available online). Figure A10 (figs. A1–
A22 available online) shows that there is little relationship between BGI
and WGI in our data set. In particular, groups with high BGI are as likely
to have high WGI levels as those with low BGI.
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argument could also be applied toWGI: a group’sWGI should
be particularly elevated when there is a lot of inequality in
geographic endowments within the region(s) populated by the
group. An agrarian group, for example, should have a higher
level of WGI if the quality of land in the region(s) it occupies
varies widely. Note that according to this argument there
should not be any systematic relationship between BGI and
WGI: while BGI is influenced by variations in geographic en-
dowments across regions inhabited by different groups, WGI
depends on variations within region(s) occupied by the same
group.
Taking account of the interaction between BGI and WGI
helps to explain seemingly anomalous cases in which a high
level of BGI does not result in elevated ethnic voting. For ex-
ample, in our data set, the average BGI levels of the three main
ethnic groups inMozambique, theTsonga, Shona, andMakua-
Lomwé, are at the upper end of the distribution. If only BGI
mattered for ethnic voting, wemight expect ethnic voting to be
high in Mozambique. However, all three ethnic groups have
among the lowest ethnic voting scores. Other factors no doubt
contribute to the lack of ethnic voting in Mozambique, but we
posit that the absence of ethnic voting may be partly a result of
its major ethnic groups having high levels of WGI. As we
demonstrate below, Mozambique is not an isolated case.
There are at least four mechanisms through which the
structure of ethnic inequality affects ethnic voting. In the rest
of this section, we develop these mechanisms and, critically,
show that any causal pathway through which BGI could affect
ethnic voting is conditioned by the level of WGI. The mech-
anisms could operate independently or, more likely, in some
combination.
First, an elevated BGI widens the gap between the pref-
erences over economic policies of different ethnic groups.
Poor groups are likely to favor poor-friendly policies, such
as public health, public education, and the provision of so-
cial transfers. Rich groups, for their part, are likely to op-
pose such policies. BGI should thus increase support for re-
distribution among poor groups but decrease it among rich
groups. However, contrary to previous authors who also dis-
cuss this mechanism (Huber and Suryanarayan 2016), we ar-
gue that this effect is conditioned by the level of WGI. When
WGI is low, members of the same ethnic groups have similar
preferences over economic policies. Thus, a high BGI com-
bined with a low WGI creates ethnic groups that have dras-
tically different policy preferences from one another but with
homogeneous within-group preferences. In South Africa, for
example, race acts as an informational shortcut for voters in
terms of the policy programs of competing parties (Ferree
2006). That is, because blacks tend to be relatively poor andThis content downloaded from 130.05
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms whites rich, parties representing different groups have differ-
ent economic platforms (Bratton and Mattes 2003; Ferree
2011). In contrast, whereWGI is high, this rationale for ethnic
voting is undermined. Members of an ethnic group with high
WGI would not share preferences over economic policy; thus,
rather than vote along ethnic lines, theymay instead vote with
cross-ethnics with whom they share economic interests. Since
there is no test of this mechanism currently available, we pro-
vide original evidence supporting it below.
Second, BGI, when combined with low WGI, strength-
ens ethnic identification, which, in turn, increases ethnic
voting. While the first mechanism is about the effect of the
structure of ethnic inequality on policy preferences, the sec-
ond mechanism is about its effect on the degree to which
people identify with their ethnic group. Building on the social
psychological literature on the interactive effects of multiple
identities (Crisp and Hewstone 2007; Roccas and Brewer
2002) and the classical political science literature on cross-
cutting and reinforcing cleavages (Bates 1974; Lipset 1960;
Rae and Taylor 1970), we expect an individual’s identification
with othermembers of his or her groupalong one cleavage (e.g.,
ethnicity, class, religion, geography) to intensify when he/she
is in the same group as them along other cleavages. Previous
studies indeed find that ethnic identification is weaker when
ethnicity is crosscut by other cleavages (e.g., Dunning and
Harrison 2010; Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Ishiyama 2012).
In particular, members of an ethnic group are likely to
feel closer to one another if they share membership in the
same social class. Individuals should identify more strongly
with their ethnicity when (1) they live under very different
economic conditions than members of other ethnic groups
(high BGI) and (2) they share the same living conditions as
other members of their group (low WGI). Under such con-
ditions, members of the same ethnic groups share similar ex-
periences of grievance or abundance, which increases their
sense of belonging to the same group (Logan, Zhang, and Alba
2002; Yancey, Ericksen, and Juliani 1976). Padilla (1985), for
instance, shows that ethnic identification among Latinos in
Chicago is driven in large part by a shared experience of dis-
crimination and economic disadvantage. Moreover, in socially
stratified societies where ethnic and class categories overlap,
ethnic salience is likely to be especially high as contact with
out-groups is minimized (Massey 2007, 56–58). Crucially, the
effect of BGI on ethnic identification is conditional on WGI.
Individuals’ group identification will be underminedwhenever
they do not live under the same conditions as other members
of their group or do not share a common group history of
deprivation or advantage. Recent work by Higashijima and
Houle (2017) supports the idea that BGI increases ethnic iden-
tification but only when WGI is low.6.097.027 on March 17, 2019 18:53:54 PM
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the more likely group membership is to affect political be-
havior in general and voting behavior in particular (Con-
over 1988). In the United States, for example, the more in-
tensively that individual Latinos identify with the broad Latino
group, the higher their level of political participation and the
greater the likelihood of their mobilizing for Latino-specific
causes (Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Masuoka 2008).
Third, and relatedly, when BGI is high and WGI low, in-
dividuals will tend to be in the same social networks as their co-
ethnics but in different networks to members of other groups.
For example, high BGI and lowWGI make it more likely that
groups will live in distinct ethnically homogenous neighbor-
hoods,5 work in different occupational niches, attend different
schools, have different hobbies, and so on (Burgess, Wilson,
and Lupton 2005; Hechter 1978; Iceland and Wilkes 2006).
In turn, individuals should be more likely to vote along eth-
nic lines when they are in the same social networks as their
coethnics. Political preferences are not formed in isolation;
rather, they are in part a product of the political preferences
and affiliations of all of the members in an individual’s social
network (Beck et al. 2004; McKenzie 2004; Pietryka and De-
Bats 2017). People prefer to avoid conflict with those in their
close social networks, and tend to adapt to prevailing political
preferences in order to fit in (Mann and Sinclair 2013). Dense
social networks that cluster along socioeconomic and ethnic
lines thus make it more likely that coethnics will vote for the
same parties because of social pressure (Sokhey and McClurg
2012). Where WGI is high, however, the effect of peer influ-
ence is mitigated. When group members inhabit social worlds
increasingly stratified by class, the networks linking members
of an ethnic group weaken, and the likelihood of individuals
belonging to multiethnic social networks increases.
Fourth, when WGI is low, BGI facilitates ethnic mobi-
lization by political entrepreneurs. Under such conditions,
the cost of mobilizing voters along ethnic lines is reduced,
while the cost of mobilizing across ethnic lines is increased.
For one thing, reinforcing class and ethnic cleavages make
it easier for politicians to mobilize voters by distributing5. Although we argue that the structure of ethnic inequality affects
whether different groups occupy distinct neighborhoods or localities, we do
not claim that it affects the distribution of groups across territories such as
states or provinces, which is more likely to be determined by long-term his-
torical factors. For example, ethnic inequality does not explain why, in Canada,
French speakers are concentrated in the province of Québec, but it is one of the
factors that help explain why French and English speakers tend to live in
different neighborhoods within the same provinces (the latter tend to live in
richer areas).
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gation and occupational concentration enable politicians to
precisely target members of a group by constructing a new
road or a school in that group’s neighborhood or by giving
government contracts to firms that are dominated by a par-
ticular ethnic group.Critically,moreover, ethnic concentration
in distinct electoral wards facilitates the monitoring of voter
behavior by party brokers (Schneider 2015).
Overlapping ethnic and class cleavages also facilitate mo-
bilization even when political entrepreneurs employ tactics
that do not involve patronage. For example, activities such as
face-to-face mobilization are geographically exclusive; a can-
vasser deployed in one neighborhood cannot be deployed in
another. Similarly, political parties can collectively mobilize
voters through allied labor unions or other workplace agents
(e.g., Buffa 1984). Therefore, if members of different ethnic
groups work in different sectors of the economy, they will be
more likely to vote for different parties.
Our emphasis on how WGI mitigates the effect of BGI
on ethnic voting is a critical departure from other research
on this subject (e.g., Huber and Suryanarayan 2016; Kolev
and Wang 2010). While the previous literature has focused
on how differences across groups affect ethnic voting, this
article shows that the internal characteristics of groups also
matter. We theorize that the effect of between-group dif-
ferences in income is conditional on how income is dis-
tributed among members of the group. While other authors
include WGI as a control variable, they do not examine
whether the effect of inequality between groups depends on
how income is distributed within groups. Yet, the four mech-
anisms suggest that BGI’s effect is contingent on WGI.
DATA
This section discusses the conceptualization and operation-
alization of our dependent and independent variables along
with other features of our data set. The unit of analysis is the
ethnic group survey year. The sample covers 563 observations
on 200 ethnic groups from 65 countries between 1995 and
2014. To capture our dependent variable (ethnic voting) and
our independent variables (BGI and WGI), we employ data
from the WVS, Afrobarometer, Latinobarometer, and CSES.
These surveys contain information on the ethnicity of re-
spondents as well as their preferences over political parties
and some indicators of their wealth or income (see below).
For each observation, we use the same survey to capture both
ethnic voting and ethnic inequality. We discuss issues relating
to the representativeness of the surveys below.
Ethnic groups are identified using the Ethnic Power Re-
lations (EPR) data set (Wimmer et al. 2009). The EPR only6.097.027 on March 17, 2019 18:53:54 PM
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ther details). Many of the countries that are missing in our
data set are excluded because the EPR codes them as ethnically
homogeneous (e.g., Lesotho). Table A1 (tables A1–A38 avail-
able online) provides summary statistics for all variables used
in the analysis. Table A2 lists the country covered.
Dependent variable
We define ethnic voting as the extent to which people of a
given ethnic group vote for different parties than do other
groups from the same country. According to this definition,
a group has a low level of ethnic voting if its members vote
the same way as members of other groups in the same coun-
try and a high level if they vote differently from them. The
concern is thus with how groups distribute their votes rather
than with the characteristics of parties or candidates them-
selves. For example, according to our conceptualization, the
ethnic voting of African Americans in the United States is high
because they vote overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party
and hardly at all for the Republican Party. This is the case de-
spite the facts that the Democratic Party is not a self-described
ethnic party and thatmostDemocratic Party candidates are not
African Americans. Appendix section 3 provides further in-
formation on this conceptualization/operationalization and on
the reasons why we did not use an alternative definition/mea-
sure.
To measure ethnic voting, we use the answers given by
the respondents to estimate the proportion of the members
of each group that supports each party. The questions on
party preferences differ somewhat across surveys. For ex-
ample, the WVS, the Latinobarometer, and rounds 3–5 of
the Afrobarometer ask for which party the respondent would
like to vote if there were an election in the near future. The
CSES asks for what party the respondents voted in the last
elections. Finally, rounds 1 and 2 of the Afrobarometer ask to
which party respondents feel the closest. Table A7 lists the
exact questions we employ for each survey/round.
Our group-level indicator of ethnic voting (EV) measures
the degree to which members from a given ethnic group vote
differently from other groups of the same country. It is based
on the measure developed by Huber and Suryanarayan (2016)
and is given by the following equation:6
EVi p
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
2
o
p
jp1
(vj;i 2 vj;2i)
2
s
;6. Our measure differs somewhat from theirs in that while they cal-
culate the difference in ethnic voting between pairs of groups, we compare
a group to all other groups from the same country.
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the total number of political parties, vj,i the proportion of mem-
bers of ethnic group i that votes for (supports) political party j,
and vj,2i the proportion of members of ethnic groups other than
group i that votes for (supports) political party j.
EV could range between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates thatmem-
bers of group i vote in exactly the same way as other groups
from the same country. In the data set, EV ranges between
0.01 (Uzbeks, Kyrgyzstan) and 0.777 (Afrikaners, South Af-
rica). The measure captures the degree to which voting pref-
erences differ between groups. Table A8 presents several sce-
narios that illustrate how the ethnic voting scores have been
calculated.
Since we construct our ethnic voting measure using sur-
vey data rather than actual voting records, our main sample
includes a number of countries typically coded as nondemoc-
racies. However, only the CSES asks the respondents to
identify the party they actually voted for. The other surveys
instead ask them to identify the party they feel closer to or the
one they would like to vote for. Unlike voting records in non-
democracies, which may be constrained by formal and infor-
mal restrictions, we do not expect the party preferences ex-
pressed in the surveys we use to be systematically biased. Our
results are unchanged if the sample is restricted to partial and
full democracies (models 3 and 4, table 1) or to full democ-
racies only (table A25).Independent variables
In addition to asking the ethnicity of the respondents and
their preferences over political parties, the Afrobarometer,
Latinobarometer, CSES, and WVS ask a number of ques-
tions that can be employed to construct indicators of the
income/wealth of the respondents. Once again, the ques-
tions differ somewhat across surveys. The CSES asks the
income quintile in which the respondent finds him- or her-
self. The WVS and the Latinobarometer ask respondents
to place themselves on a scale from 1 to 10, where 10 is the
richest.
However, the Afrobarometer has no question on income.
Most countries it covers are poor, and a large fraction of their
citizens do not have access to monetized income (Bratton
2008). The Afrobarometer, however, has questions about the
ownership of a number of assets: a radio, television, andmotor
vehicle. We follow previous authors and construct an asset-
based-wealth (ABW) indicator of economic well-being (e.g.,
Dionne, Inman, and Montinola 2014; Houle 2015). It ranges
from 0 (the respondent owns none of the assets) to 3 (he or
she owns all of the assets).6.097.027 on March 17, 2019 18:53:54 PM
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to construct measures of BGI and WGI for each ethnic
group of each country. We measure BGI as follows:
BGIi p log
gi
G2i
  2
;
where gi refers to the average income (or ABW score) of
members of ethnic group i, and G2i to the average income
(or ABW score) of members of other ethnic groups. We
thus calculate BGI in a very similar manner to Cederman,
Weidmann, and Gleditsch’s (2011) and Houle’s (2015). The
only difference between our formula and theirs is that in our
case G2i gives the average wealth of individuals from the same
country but from different groups, while they use the average
wealth of all individuals from that country (including the
group for which they are calculating BGI).
This point is important because EVi compares the voting
behavior of group i with that of other groups of the same
country (as captured by vj,2i), not the voting behavior of all
citizens of the country. Therefore, our measures of ethnic vot-
ing and BGI are consistent. Moreover, including the income of
all groups in the denominator tends to underestimate the BGI
value of large groups because such measures include many of
the same individuals in the numerator and denominator. Ap-
pendix section 6 shows that, contrary to measures that include
all groups in the denominator, our approach does not sys-
tematically underestimate the BGI level of large groups.
The WGI of a given ethnic group is calculated as the Gini
coefficient among itsmembers. For all countries, we calculate a
Gini coefficient for each group separately. The Gini coefficient
is computed using the command ineqdec0 in STATA. Thus,
BGIi measures inequality between a typical member of ethnic
group i and a typical member of another group from the same
country, and WGIi the level of inequality among members of
group i. Appendix section 4 provides more information on the
indicators of BGI and WGI. It also discusses some of the al-
ternative measures available. Table A13 shows that the results
are unchanged if we use themeasures of Houle (2015) or Kuhn
and Weidmann (2015).
The correlation between BGI and WGI is only 0.047.
Appendix section 5 provides more information about the
relationship between BGI and WGI. Scatter plots show that
there is little relationship between BGI and WGI. There-
fore, it makes sense to look at the effect of BGI at different
levels of WGI.
One potential limitation with our approach is that there
may be systematic differences between the indicators cal-
culated from the diverse surveys used in the analysis. In
particular, the wealth scales on which the BGI and WGI
values are based differ across surveys. In the main analysis,This content downloaded from 130.05
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms we employ survey fixed effects to account for this issue. This
follows the common practice in the literature (e.g., Huber
2012). It must be noted, however, that the indicators of Houle
(2015), which we use in table A13, have been standardized
across surveys. Furthermore, our results are robust when we
standardize the observations by taking advantage of the fact
that there is some (albeit limited) overlap across surveys (ta-
ble A14).
Survey representativeness
There are three potential problems associated with the use
of survey data to create measures of BGI, WGI, and ethnic
voting, all of which are related to the representativeness of
the surveys at the group level. The first problem is that sur-
veys have few respondents on some ethnic groups. In order
to minimize this issue, we retained only ethnic group-survey
observations with at least 30 respondents (findings are un-
changed if the threshold is increased to 40; table A36).7 Fig-
ure A1 shows a histogram of the survey samples of all obser-
vations included in the analysis. To make sure that the results
are not driven by observations with few respondents, we show
that they are robust when we exclude observations with fewer
than 50, 75, or 100 respondents (models 1, 2, and 3, table A3,
respectively), or when we omit small ethnic groups (table A4).
The second problem is that the survey samples may not be
representative of the ethnic composition of the countries. For
example, some groups may be less likely to be captured by the
surveys. Table A5 lists all the politically relevant groups that
are included and missing for each country in our analysis,
along with their size and political status (taken from the
EPR). Groups that are missing are usually small because these
groups tend to have fewer respondents (see app. sec. 2). Very
few large groups are missing. Only 18 out of 195 ethnic groups
that comprise at least 5% of the population of their country are
missing in all surveys.
Relatedly, it is possible that, among groups that are in-
cluded in the analysis, some are overrepresented in the sam-
ples, while others are underrepresented. We address this issue
by constructing a histogram for each country/survey/year that
compares the number of respondents on each ethnic group in
the sample (fig. A22, top panels) to the group size of each ethnic
group in the full population (bottom panels) according to the
EPR. On average, the samples from the surveys are fairly
representative of the overall population. Importantly, there is6.097.027 on March 17, 2019 18:53:54 PM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
8. These correlations are very high, given that the censuses and sur-
veys are often not conducted in the same years and that categories are not
always defined the same way. For example, a survey could define urban
areas as those with at least 6,000 inhabitants and the corresponding census
as those with at least 5,000 inhabitants.
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sented. Moreover, there are few large groups for which our
indicators rely on a low number of respondents. For example,
there are only three groups that represent at least 20% of the
population of their country onwhichwe have fewer than 80 ob-
servations in at least one survey. Our results are not driven by
these cases since our findings are unchanged when we exclude
observations based on fewer than 100 respondents.
The third problem is that although the surveys are con-
structed to be representative along several key demograph-
ics at the national level, they may not be representative at the
group level. For example, a survey could overrepresent the
poor members of a given ethnic group, which would create
substantial measurement error in BGI and WGI. This prob-
lem is potentially more severe for groups with few respon-
dents, so the fact that the results are robust when groups with
few respondents are omitted mitigates (but does not elimi-
nate) these concerns.
Unfortunately, we do not have the information neces-
sary to be certain that the samples are representative at the
group level. If we had detailed knowledge of the proportion
of members of every group that is poor, for example, we
would not need to use these surveys to calculate BGI and
WGI in the first place. However, we ran three additional
sets of analyses in order to assess the potential unrepresenta-
tiveness of the surveys at the group level. These analyses focus
on dimensions other than income. The first looks at whether
the survey samples are representative in terms of the gender
composition of the groups. In most groups (and countries),
the gender composition should be roughly 50∶50. We find
that only 24 out of 563 ethnic group survey observations (4.26%)
have unrepresentative gender ratios—defined as gender ratios
outside the 40∶60 bounds. At the same time, 4 out of 196
country surveys (2.04%) have unrepresentative gender ratios.
We run a test to assess whether the difference between the two
proportions is statistically significant, and we find that it is not
(pp :1557).
The second set of analyses compares the samples from
the surveys with ethnic group-level and national-level data
from national censuses along several dimensions: average
age, age composition (e.g., proportion of individuals 20–
25 years old), educational attainment (e.g., proportion of
individuals with a college degree), and the proportion of in-
dividuals living in urban areas. Ethnic group-level censuses
are not available for all countries, so the analyses on age, edu-
cation, and urban/rural distribution are based on 12, 7, and
16 countries, respectively. First, we show that the ethnic group-
level data from the surveys are highly correlated with those
from the censuses (see table A6). The correlation levels be-
tween the group-level surveys and census data range betweenThis content downloaded from 130.05
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms 0.6815 and 0.8845 and are always significant at the .01% level.8
Second, we also calculated the correlations between the sur-
veys and the censuses at the national level. For three out of
four variables, the surveys are actually more representative
(i.e., the correlation is higher) at the group than at the country
level. The only exception is for age composition, and even
in that case the difference between the group- and country-
level correlations is marginal and not statistically significant
(pp :1556). Therefore, the sample surveys are fairly repre-
sentative in terms of the gender ratio, age, education, and ur-
ban/rural distribution at the group level, and there is little
evidence that they are more representative at the national than
at the group level along these dimensions.
In the third set of analyses, we have recalculated BGI,
WGI, and ethnic voting using weights to account for the po-
tential lack of representativeness of the ethnic group-level
samples. We chose to focus on the proportion of individuals
living in urban areas since this is the dimension for which
census data are the most widely available. Moreover, misrep-
resentation along this dimension may create particularly se-
rious measurement error because individuals living in rural
areas are often poorer. Among groups for which urban indi-
viduals are overrepresented, urban respondents have a weight
lower than one and rural respondents a weight higher than
one, while we do the opposite when urban individuals are
underrepresented. The correlation levels between the BGI,
WGI, and ethnic voting values used in the main analysis and
those that have been weighted are very high: 0.9627, 0.9959,
and 0.9882, respectively.
To be clear, these analyses do not completely solve the
issue. For example, the group-level samples could be repre-
sentative in terms of gender, age, education, and urban/rural
distribution but not income.Moreover, the additional analyses
(with the exception of the one on gender) cover a relatively
small number of countries, which may not be representative.
Thus, we redo our main analysis with indicators of BGI and
WGI that are not constructed from survey data. We use the
measures of Kuhn andWeidmann (2015), who use geographic
information systems (GIS) data on light emissions along with
maps on ethnic group settlement. To our knowledge, these are
the only authors who provide ethnic group–level measures of
BGI andWGI based on GIS. Results are unchanged (model 1,
table A13). However, measures based on GIS also have some6.097.027 on March 17, 2019 18:53:54 PM
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between members of different groups when they live in the
same urban areas (Huber and Mayoral 2014). Ultimately, the
consistency of our results across measures mitigates concerns
over measurement.
Control variables
Since it is difficult to control for all possible country-level
determinants of ethnic voting, our main models include
country fixed effects (although we also run the analysis with-
out country fixed effects). The analysis also uses a number of
group- and country-level control variables. We control for the
size of the ethnic group (EPR), which may be related to the
salience of ethnicity (Posner 2004), as well as a dummy vari-
able for politically excluded groups (EPR).
Moreover, it is possible that ethnic inequality has a
stronger effect on ethnic voting among poor groups. Pre-
vious research has shown that subordinate (poor) groups are
more sensitive to relative group status than dominant (rich)
groups (Miller et al. 1981). We include a dummy variable
(Poor) that takes the value one if the ethnic group’s income (or
ABW) is lower than that of the other ethnic groups of the same
country included in the analysis. Among the time-variant
country-level controls, we include gross domestic product per
capita (logged; World Bank 2016). It is also possible that eth-
nic voting will be more important in weak democracies since
programmatic political parties are less likely to be established.
We control for the Polity score.
The regressions that do not include country fixed effects
control for additional time-invariant country-level variables.
As shown by Huber (2012), democracies with proportional
representation (PR) are likely to have less ethnic voting. We
include a dummy variable that takes the value one if a country
has PR (Bormann and Golder 2013; Johnson and Wallack
2012). We also control for ethnic fractionalization (EPR). De-
centralization could influence ethnic voting. Therefore, we
include a dummy variable for federalism (Treisman 2008). Par-
liamentarianism tends to strengthen political parties, and sowe
include dummy variables for presidential and semipresidential
systems based on the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz,
Keefer, and Scartascini 2016). We add dummy variables for
each survey (the CSES is the excluded dummy).
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
All models use ordinary least squares. We test our hypothesis
by including an interaction between BGI and WGI. Our hy-
pothesis would be supported if the coefficient on BGI is pos-
itive and that on the interaction term is negative.
Two caveats are in order. First, we do not examine whether
changes in the BGI and WGI scores of a given ethnic groupThis content downloaded from 130.05
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms over time lead to changes in its level of ethnic voting (i.e., we
do not include ethnic group fixed effects). Our data set simply
does not exhibit enough variation in BGI and WGI within
ethnic groups over time to test such a relationship. In fact,
many previous studies have assumed that BGI, WGI, or
crosscuttingness are constant over extended periods of time
(e.g., Cederman et al. 2011; Selway 2011). Moreover, it is well
known that once parties have been formed and support bases
established, party identification has a substantial degree of
inertia (Converse 1976; Green and Palmquist 1994). That is,
voters come to identify with parties per se, even if the policies
pursued by those parties no longer best reflect their material
interests. Thus, even if there is some change in the relative
levels of BGI and WGI over time, political realignments are
likely to lag such economic changes, perhaps by as much as a
generation (Bates 1974). In the United States, for example,
African American voters continue to vote overwhelmingly for
the Democratic Party, even as WGI has increased in recent
decades with the growth of an African American middle class
(Dawson 1994).
Second, it is possible that ethnic voting might cause, or con-
tribute to, ethnic inequality. If an ethnic group votes along
ethnic lines, its representatives could adopt policies that favor
that particular group, which would increase its income/wealth.
If the group is rich (i.e., if its average income is higher than the
average income of members of other groups in the country),
that would increase its BGI level; potentially creating reverse
causation. Limitations with our data set prevent us from adopt-
ing strategies to address endogeneity fully in our analysis.
Although it is an important limitation, we do not believe
that reverse causation drives our results. First, ethnic voting
is only likely to increase the BGI level of rich groups. Pol-
icies that increase the income/wealth of poor groups would
decrease their BGI level; meaning that, among poor groups,
reverse causation is likely to reduce the estimated effect of
BGI. In table A27, we redo our analysis with interaction terms
between BGI,WGI, BGI#WGI, and Poor. Results show that
the effect of ethnic inequality is the same in poor and rich
groups (i.e., none of the interactions are significant).
Second, evidence suggests that ethnic inequality signifi-
cantly predates the formation of contemporary state insti-
tutions and, therefore, ethnic voting. For example, Alesina
et al. (2016, 428) study “the roots of ethnic inequality and
establish that differences in geographic endowments across
ethnic homelands explain a sizable fraction of the observed
variation in economic disparities across groups.” They es-
timate that about 55% of the variation in ethnic inequality
across countries is explained by variation in geographic en-
dowments across groups. Thus, variation in the geographical
distribution of endowments across ethnic homelands rather6.097.027 on March 17, 2019 18:53:54 PM
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inequality. In fact, BGI is remarkably slow moving within
ethnic groups over time.
Third, in appendix section 9, we perform an instru-
mental variable analysis. We instrument for BGI using the
data on the geographical distribution of endowments across
ethnic groups of Alesina et al. (2016). Unfortunately, we are
only able to do the analysis at the country level, since the
data on geographic endowments are not available at the
group level. On balance, results are robust. Like most instru-
ments, this one has important limitations, notably because it
may not be completely exogenous. Geographic endowments
could directly affect the capacity of groups to establish parties
by providing resources that can be employed to develop the
party and build patronage networks. This test should thus be
interpreted with caution.EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In table 1, we estimate the effect of the structure of ethnic
inequality on ethnic voting. Model 1 includes all countries,
regardless of their regime, as well as country fixed effects.
The coefficients on both BGI and BGI#WGI are of the
expected signs (positive and negative, respectively) and are
statistically significant at the 1% level. BGI increases ethnic
voting when WGI is low, but its effect diminishes as WGI
increases.
Figure 1A shows the marginal effect of BGI at different
levels of WGI along with 95% confidence intervals. BGI in-
creases ethnic voting until WGI attains a value of about 0.37,
which represents approximately 76% of the sample. Above this
threshold, however, the effect of BGI is no longer significant.
Figure 1B plots the effect of BGI on the predicted ethnic voting
value for ethnic groups with low (10th percentile of the WGI
distribution) and high (90th percentile) WGI levels. While
increasing BGI increases ethnic voting sharply for groups with
lowWGI, it has no discernible effect for those with highWGI.
Model 2 redoes model 1 without country fixed effects.
Models 3 and 4 redo models 1 and 2 with only partial and
full democracies, measured as countries with a Polity score
of at least one. In table A25, we also redo the analysis with
only countries that are full democracies (Polity score of at
least six). Results are robust. Figures A18–A20 plot the mar-
ginal effect of BGI based on models 2–4 of table 1.
Our findings on the control variables are consistent with
those of the previous literature (in particular Huber 2012).
We find that PR and federalism decrease ethnic voting and
that richer countries have more ethnic voting. Moreover,
larger groups are less likely to vote along ethnic lines. We
also have novel findings. For example, we find that presi-This content downloaded from 130.05
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms dential systems have less ethnic voting, presumably because
they tend to have weaker parties.Preferences for redistribution
This section provides original empirical evidence in favor of
our first mechanism, according to which BGI should in-
crease the gap between the preferences over redistribution
of rich and poor groups, especially when WGI is low. We
do not directly test the second mechanism because there is
already an article that provides such a test using BGI and
WGI measures similar to ours (Higashijima and Houle 2017).
Using the Afrobarometer, they show that BGI increases the
likelihood that a respondent identifies more strongly with his
or her ethnicity than his or her nationality and that BGI’s effect
weakens as WGI increases. No such evidence is currently
available for the first mechanism. Mechanisms 3 and 4 are not
directly tested either, but they draw extensively on the liter-
atures on social networks and mobilization.
The tests are presented and discussed in detail in ap-
pendix section 10. Using multiple questions from the sur-
veys, we develop an indicator of the degree to which mem-
bers of each ethnic group support redistribution (questions
are listed in table A23). Table A24 tests the effect of the
structure of ethnic inequality on support for redistribution
among poor and rich groups. To do so, we include BGI,
WGI, BGI#WGI, and their interactions with Poor. Among
rich groups, BGI decreases support for redistribution, and its
effect weakens as WGI increases. Moreover, the two inter-
action terms between BGI=BGI#WGI and Poor are of the
expected signs (positive and negative, respectively) and sig-
nificant at the 1% level. This indicates that BGI indeed in-
creases the gap in preferences over redistribution between
rich and poor groups when WGI is low. This is the first test
to show that the structure of ethnic inequality has different
effects on support for redistribution among rich and poor
groups.Robustness tests
The appendix shows that the results are robust to addi-
tional tests. First, in the main text our unit of analysis is the
ethnic group. In appendix section 8, we present a country-
level analysis using country-level indicators of ethnic voting
that are similar to those of Huber (2012). On balance, we
find that countries with high BGI have more ethnic voting.
Again, the effect of BGI weakens as WGI increases. This anal-
ysis improves on the most extensive country-level tests avail-
able. For example, while Huber and Suryanarayan’s (2016)
cross-national test focuses on 13 countries, ours covers more
than 60 countries. Kolev and Wang (2010) cover 81 countries6.097.027 on March 17, 2019 18:53:54 PM
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Table 1. Effect of the Structure of Ethnic Inequality on Ethnic VotingThis conten
All use subject to UniversiAll Regimest downloaded from 130.056.097.027 on March 
ty of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http:Partial and Full Democracies(1) (2) (3)17, 2019 18:53:54 PM
//www.journals.uchicago.ed(4)BGI .0422*** .0436*** .0430*** .0395***
(.00691) (.0107) (.00724) (.0114)WGI 2.0982 2.0958 2.111 2.166
(.137) (.132) (.153) (.153)BGI # WGI 2.0882*** 2.103** 2.0929*** 2.0873**
(.0305) (.0398) (.0299) (.0435)Group size 2.0579** 2.0736** 2.0670** 2.0854**
(.0268) (.0357) (.0301) (.0401)Poor 2.0115 2.00951 2.00662 2.00465
(.0111) (.0139) (.0117) (.0151)Excluded 2.0162 2.0399 2.0322 2.0482
(.0215) (.0278) (.0239) (.0318)GDP per capita (logged) .0255** .0178* .0275** .0308***
(.0126) (.00974) (.0129) (.00981)Polity score 2.000170 .00602** 2.0198* 2.00809
(.00773) (.00233) (.0109) (.00825)Ethnic fractionalization .00461 .0374
(.0798) (.0852)Federalism 2.0639** 2.101***
(.0287) (.0285)Proportional representation 2.0739** 2.0871***
(.0295) (.0310)Presidential 2.0639** 2.0557*
(.0320) (.0309)Semipresidential .0354 .0441
(.0675) (.0680)Latinobarometer .0152 2.111** .00698 2.132***
(.0191) (.0432) (.0200) (.0464)World Value Survey .0182 2.0271 .0167 2.0377
(.0187) (.0348) (.0204) (.0356)Afrobarometer .00634 2.0372 .00215 2.0748
(.0242) (.0445) (.0265) (.0503)Country fixed effects Yes No Yes No
No. of countries 65 65 58 58
No. of ethnic groups 200 200 175 175
N 563 563 507 507
R2 .666 .328 .672 .350Note. Ordinary least squares estimates. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. BGI p between-group in-
equality; WGI p within-group inequality; GDP p gross domestic product.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.u/t-and-c).
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Huber and Suryanarayan (2016) make the argument that
BGI should be more relevant to countries with majoritarian
as opposed to PR electoral systems. According to these au-
thors, BGI is not relevant in PR systems because party entry
is easy, and so parties representing the same ethnicity com-
pete with one another. WGI, however, encourages internal
splits in PR systems. In contrast, although we agree that PR
should reduce ethnic voting, we argue that the structure of
ethnic inequality is relevant regardless of the electoral system
in place. Under a majoritarian system with two dominant
parties, members of the same group should become more
likely to support the same party as BGI increases, especially
when WGI is low. Even under PR, however, BGI increases
the incentives of individuals from the same ethnic groups
to support the same parties, and its effect should decrease as
WGI increases because of the emergence of internal splits.9. Moreover, app. sec. 7 follows the approach of Huber and Surya-
narayan (2016) and uses the ethnic group pair as its unit of analysis. There
are two main problems with using the ethnic group pair: (1) it does not
enable us to test whether the effect of BGI is contingent on WGI, which is
our central argument, and (2) it assumes that all ethnic group pairs are
potentially equally relevant.
This content downloaded from 130.05
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms In table A26, we add interaction terms between BGI, WGI,
BGI#WGI, and PR. Table A20 redoes the test at the coun-
try level. We find no evidence that the effect depends on the
electoral system.
One could argue that the effect of ethnic inequality may
be different for poor and rich ethnic groups. For example,
poor groups may be more likely to resent inequality. In ta-
ble A27, we redo the analysis with interaction terms between
BGI, WGI, BGI#WGI, and Poor. Our findings suggest that
the effect of BGI is similar in poor and rich groups. This
finding contradicts the expectations of a number of previous
authors who argue that the effect should be strongest among
poor groups (e.g., Hechter 1978; Miller et al. 1981). These
results suggest that ethnic inequality does not influence po-
litical behavior only by generating grievances.
Moreover, it could be countered that as WGI increases,
wealthier political entrepreneurs have more resources to mo-
bilize their poorer coethnics, which would facilitate mobili-
zation (Tilly 1978).We argue against this view for a number of
reasons. First, while private resources can be used to mobilize
voters, political entrepreneurs can also employ public re-
sources, which weakens the link between politicians’ wealth
and their capacity to mobilize voters. Second, as noted above,
lowWGI reduces the cost of ethnicmobilization, meaning that
politicians need fewer resources to mobilize the group. Third,Figure 1. Marginal effects and predicted values based on model 1 of table 1. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. A, Marginal effect of BGI
(between-group inequality) across WGI (within-group inequality) values. B, Effect of BGI on the predicted ethnic voting value when WGI is low (left) and when
WGI is high (right).6.097.027 on March 17, 2019 18:53:54 PM
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Americans mobilized by white politicians being a case in point
(Katznelson 1973). Fourth, low WGI would be no barrier to
mobilization in rich groups as potential group leaders should
have ample resources. As shown above, results do not depend
on whether the group is rich or poor.
However, one could argue that this is an empirical ques-
tion. Although our results show that BGI’s effect does not
strengthen as WGI increases, it could be strongest at middle
levels of WGI: under such conditions, the group would be rel-
atively homogeneous and its elites would have enough re-
sources to mobilize its members. In the appendix, we show that
the effect of BGI is not strongest among groups with inter-
mediate WGI levels (table A33, fig. A21).
Tables A9–A11 show that the results are not driven by
outliers on BGI, WGI, and ethnic voting. For each variable,
we exclude, in turn, observations that have values below the
1st percentile, below the 5th percentile, above the 95th per-
centile, and above the 99th percentile of the distribution. We
also calculate the Cook’s distance of each observation and drop
observations with a Cook’s distance above 4/n (table A12).
Results are robust to additional control variables. First,
the geographical dispersion of groups could affect both eth-
nic inequality and the capacity of groups to mobilize, which
could create a spurious relationship between the two. For ex-
ample, groups that are concentrated within one region may
find it easier to organize around the same party. At the same
time, groups that live in different regions may have very dif-
ferent income levels than other groups from the same country.
Thus, we redo the analysis with variables from the Geo-EPR
that distinguish between geographically dispersed and con-
centrated groups (table A35; variable descriptions are in the
table note).
Second, to deal with the possibility that ethnic voting and
ethnic inequality may be due to the type of party-voter linkage
system, table A30 includes a measure (Material Exchange)
from the database of the Democratic Accountability and
Linkages Project that captures the degree to which party
linkages rely on patronage (Kitschelt 2013). Third, Eifert,
Miguel, and Posner (2010) argue that ethnic voting is more
prevalent in countries in which elections are competitive.
We control for competitiveness, calculated as the vote share
differential between the two candidates (or parties) with the
first and second most votes in the previous election from
the Database of Political Institutions (table A29). Fourth,
some countries have imposed bans on ethnic parties. Un-
fortunately, data on ethnic party bans are only available for
sub-Saharan Africa. Table A31 includes a control for whether
a country has an ethnic party ban (Moroff 2010). We also
show that the effect does not depend onwhether there is a ban.This content downloaded from 130.05
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Fifth, tables A28 and A32 redo the analysis with district mag-
nitude (logged) and variables for open and closed list PR (Da-
tabase of Political Institutions) rather than the PR dummy var-
iable.
Finally, we make sure results are not affected by multi-
collinearity, especially between BGI and WGI. We calculate
the variance inflation factor (VIF) of all variables using
model 2 of table 1 (excluding the interaction term). None of
the variables has a VIF above 10, which is the threshold usu-
ally used to detect multicollinearity. BGI and WGI have a VIF
of 1.18 and 2.42, respectively.CONCLUSION
This article argues and empirically demonstrates that ethnic
voting depends on the full structure of ethnic inequality. More
specifically, the effect of BGI on ethnic voting is contingent
on WGI: BGI increases ethnic voting, but the magnitude of
its effect decreases as WGI increases. This is the first cross-
national empirical test of whether the effect of inequality be-
tween ethnic groups on ethnic voting is conditional on the level
of inequality within ethnic groups.
Our results have important implications for the study of
ethnicity and voting. Crucially, they point to the importance
of looking at the full structure of social cleavages rather than
each cleavage in isolation (Lipset 1960). The existence of dif-
ferent ethnic groups by itself does not cause ethnic voting.
Other factors seem to be needed to explain why in some
instances people vote along ethnic lines while in others they
do not. In this article, we have shown that how ethnicity in-
teracts with economic cleavages is one of these factors. Our
findings suggest that ethnicity has more influence on voting
behavior when it is reinforced by inequality. Moreover, while
much previous research has assumed that a high level of in-
equality between groups necessarily implies a low level of in-
equality within them, we show that this is not the case. Rather,
our findings indicate the need to take account of the condi-
tioning effect of within-group differences when considering
the effect of between-group cleavages on political behavior.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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